Safety controls
The ways software that moves money usually fails, and what Syncly does about each one.
Canteen's essay Agents and Ledgers in 2026↗ lists the mistakes an AI can make with money that still leave the books balanced. This page goes through them one by one.
Who we pay
The risk: paying the wrong party. Reconciling against the chain can't catch it, because the chain confirms you paid exactly whom you chose.
What we do:
- Each seller's payout address is pinned per service in
payees.json↗, which is reviewed in git. A new service is pinned on its first payment. - If a seller asks to be paid at a different address, the payment is refused before anything is signed and the refusal goes into the CFO's log for review.
- Every payee, and every customer wallet before an escrow opens, is screened against Circle's USDC blacklist. Every address we or a Pay business deal with is re-screened daily, and one hop out: the other side of every USDC transfer they make or receive on Arc is screened too.
- An escrow's customer is fixed when it opens, and only that wallet can receive a refund or a bond.
Paying twice
The risk: a call times out, the software retries, and the seller is paid twice.
What we do: an agent's payment has two phases, a free request that returns the price and then the signed payment. A timeout before signing is retried. A timeout after signing is ambiguous (the seller may already have the money), so it is not retried. The agent retries only when the seller says it didn't take the payment. A test against a fake seller↗ checks each case.
Payments that never happened
The risk: the books record a payment that never went out.
What we do: a receipt line is written only after a paid call succeeds. Each is then linked to the settlement transaction Circle Gateway produced on Arc, a record from outside our own books.
Rounding
The risk: reading 6.000000 as 6.00 and hiding the difference in a "round-off" account.
What we do: the ledger keeps USDC's six decimals and refuses an unbalanced entry. There is no silent round-off account.
Letting a model release money
The risk: an escrow that pays out because an AI said "HIGH confidence".
What we do: only the customer's wallet releases a payment. The CFO's rules are deterministic, and AI models only produce the work and check it. The Auditor can flag work but can't approve a payment.
An entry with no document
The risk: a ledger line nobody can trace to a real order.
What we do: every ledger line points to its job. Every escrow seals the terms (specHash) and the delivery (deliverableHash) on-chain, so terms, delivery and payment can be matched.
A business's own payments (Syncly Pay)
Syncly Pay moves a customer business's money, not ours, so it has its own controls, most of them in the InvoiceBook↗ contract:
| Risk | Control |
|---|---|
| A pay link edited to send the money elsewhere | The payee is fixed on-chain when the invoice is booked; pay only transfers to it. |
| An invoice paid twice | pay works once per invoice; a second call reverts. The Investigator also stops a bill that matches one already booked (same document, or same supplier and invoice number) before it is booked at all. |
| A supplier's "new bank details" scam | Each supplier's payout address is pinned after the first payment. A bill with a different address is stopped until the owner says they called the supplier on a number they already had. |
| An invoice with no real document | Each invoice's document hash is fixed before any money moves; the pay page shows the document and its hash. |
| Someone invoicing in a business's name | Only the CFO's key can book, and only after the business confirms its email. A new payout address for an existing business waits for the same confirmation. |
| A sanctioned address | Every payee is screened against Circle's USDC blacklist when it's checked, again every day, and one hop out (whoever it trades with on Arc). A hit stops payments to it. |
| An agent paying bills on its own | Autopay runs from the business's own PayVault account: the contract lets the CFO pay only suppliers the owner approved, under the owner's per-bill and weekly caps, and only booked invoices. Anything else is a proposal the owner approves from their wallet. The desk offers a supplier for autopay only after the owner has paid it once. |
| Rounding | Exact USDC to 6 decimals; the 0.5% fee is floored, in the payee's favour. |
Limits the agents can't talk past
| Limit | Enforced by |
|---|---|
| Sellers allowed per service | The payment code, before signing |
| Budget per job, price cap per call | The payment code, before signing |
CFO moves at most maxMove alone (7 USDC today, set by the Boss) | The SynclyVault contract (maxMove) |
| Weekly tool budget, reserve floor, bond cover | The SynclyVault contract |
| Only the customer accepts or rejects | The JobEscrow contract |
| Autopay only to approved suppliers, under per-bill and weekly caps | The PayVault contract |
| Only a business's owner withdraws its autopay money or changes its rules | The PayVault contract |
| A mid-week re-plan stays inside the weekly tool budget | The SynclyVault contract (setAllowance) |
Something unclear or wrong? See this page's source ↗